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PLEBISCITES, THE GUARANTY CLAUSE, AND
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
James M. Fischer*
The people are to be taken in very small doses.
Emerson
Democracy is the worst form of government except all those
other forms that have been tried from time to time.
Winston Churchill
Bad laws are the worst sort of Tyranny.
Edmund Burke
Legislation is too serious a matter to be left to the
Legislators.
With apologies to General Charles De Gaulle

In 1912 the U.S. Supreme Court refused, in Pacific States
Telephone & Telegraph v. Oregon,' to examine the
constitutional validity of an initiative enacted statute
imposing an annual license fee on telephone and telegraph
companies. The Court found the telephone company's claim,
that the plebiscite's 2 bypassing of the Oregon legislature
3
violated Article IV, Section 2 of the federal Constitution, to
* J.D., Loyola of Los Angeles. The author is a Professor of Law,
Southwestern University School of Law.
1. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
2. I use the term "plebiscite" to reflect the reserved power of the people to
enact legislation through the initiative or referendum, or constitutional
amendments through the initiative (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "ballot
propositions"). The term "direct democracy" is synonymous with the term
"plebiscite." The term "direct legislation" is synonymous with the terms
"initiative" and "referendum."
3. Article IV, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
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be a nonjusticiable political question.4
Although the Court's decision saved the plebiscite from
federal constitutional challenge,5 this was not a ringing
endorsement, nor could it be said that the plebiscite was
universally popular. Some saw then, as some see now, the
plebiscite as a cancer on the body politic: "This country is
facing today a crisis as serious as any which has occurred in
its history, except that of the Civil War. Popular government
is being put to the test, and the outcome will determine
whether the people of this country are capable of governing
themselves."6 This unsympathetic view of the plebiscite has,
if anything, intensified over time. Ironically, the plebiscite,
once the darling of progressives, is now seen by some modern
progressives to be more detriment than benefit, more cause
for concern than celebration. 7
A number of legal scholars have questioned the
correctness and limits of the Court's decision not to entertain
a Guaranty Clause challenge to the plebiscite. Justice Hans
Linde has argued that the Court's jurisdiction-based decision
in Pacific States is not binding on the States.8 The late
Professor Eule, perhaps following in the wake of resurgent
scholarly interest in "republican" values,9 contended that the
basic constitutional theme of republican representative
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence." The first part of section 4 is commonly
referred to as the "Guaranty (or Guarantee) Clause."
4. See Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 151.
5. Plebiscites remain subject to constitutional challenge on the ground they
violate specific constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967) (The Court invalidated a state initiative, which prohibited any state
interference in deciding ownership of property to sell, lease, or rent realty to
whomever the seller wished, as violative of the 14th Amendment Equal
Protection Clause).
6. Henry M. Campbell, The Initiative & Referendum, 10 MICH. L. REV. 427
(1912).
7. A forceful critique of the plebiscite, particularly with respect to its use in
housing and zoning issues, was made in Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum:
Democratic Barrierto RacialEquality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979).
8. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican
Government": The Campaign againstHomosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993).
9. See Richard Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
This modern "civic republicanism" should be
distinguished from the ideological republicanism of the Founders. See generally
GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1968); BERNARD

BAILEY, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
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government requires of the judiciary that it give less
deference to legislation enacted by the electorate than would
be afforded were that very same legislation adopted by the
legislature."
Unlike the issue-specific approach that has been the
practice when courts examine the legality of measures
adopted through the plebiscite, Justice Linde and Professor
Eule would accept broad structural limitations on the
plebiscite. These limitations would be beyond immediate
popular control since they would be derived from federal
constitutional principles. There are many other scholarly
contributors to this discussion and I do not mean to slight
them by emphasizing the scholarship of Justice Linde and
Professor Eule. I believe that the views developed by Justice
Linde and Professor Eule provide, however, a coherent,
although flawed, argument for judicial enforcement of the
federal Guaranty Clause-what I will characterize in this
paper as the "guaranty thesis." Understanding this thesis is
key to analyzing the role the Guaranty Clause is seen by
many legal scholars to play in the debate over the validity
and merit of the plebiscite. I wish to develop and critique this
"guaranty thesis" first, and then address the arguments
Justice Linde has made in his paper for this conference.
The essence of the "guaranty thesis," as I understand it,
is that state courts are not precluded by the Supreme Court's
decision-making in the Guaranty Clause cases from using the
Clause themselves to review the constitutionality of ballot
propositions. In exercising this power, state courts could
review ballot propositions from either (or both) of two
perspectives. First, the state court could adopt what I would
characterize as the substantive guaranty clause approach.
Under this approach the state court would examine the ballot
proposition against a norm of "republican government."1" If

10. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503 (1990).
11. This view has been extensively developed by Justice Linde in his
writings on ballot initiatives. See Hans A. Linde, Taking Oregon's Initiative
Toward a New Century, 34 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 391 (1998); Hans A. Linde,
Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1735 (1998) [hereinafter Linde, Forgotten Law]; Hans A. Linde, On
Reconstructing "Republican Government," 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. Rev. 193 (1994);
Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 709 (1994); Linde, supra note 8.
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the ballot proposition failed to meet that norm, it would be
struck down. Second, the state court could use a procedural
guarantee clause approach. Under this approach, the state
court would subject the ballot proposition to a strict, "hard
look" standard of review. The purpose of the "harder look"
would be to safeguard minorities and other vulnerable groups
from the dangers posed by ballot propositions that are facially
neutral yet have discriminatory effects. The presence of
discriminatory effects would permit the court to strike down
the ballot proposition. 12
The thesis's substantive prong rests on a reading of the
Guaranty Clause that ultimately must find a mooring in
either the original understanding of the provision or
contemporary views of what the Clause requires-which
largely means what role do we think the Clause should fill. I
have problems with either point of the thesis's substantive
prong.
The thesis's historical argument runs into the age-old
problem of proof. An appeal to history suggests a provable
connection in fact that is demonstrably accurate.
The
difficulty is that in our post-modern age, appeals to history
often raise value issues themselves, particularly when the
historical record is rich and varied, as it is here. The
Constitutional Convention's records, Federalist Papers, and
the state ratifying convention debates contain a smorgasbord
of comments, insights, views, and arguments regarding the
various provisions in the Constitution drafted in Philadelphia
in 1787. Like the Bible, these sources can be mined and
cherry-picked for propositions that will support almost any
position one could wish to take on the relationship between
direct democracy and the Guarantee Clause. For example,
sometimes the Federalist Papers suggest that the Guaranty
Clause permits the states extreme latitude in choosing their
form of government. 3 On other occasions, the Federalist
12. This view was developed by Professor Eule. See Julian N. Eule,
Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of
ElectoralReprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733 (1994); Eule, supra note 10.
13. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionality of the Initiative and
Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 637, 651 n.99 (1980) (citing THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL

STATE

CONVENTIONS

ON

THE

ADOPTION

OF

THE

FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION (Jonathon Elliot ed., 1881) [hereinafter ELLIOT DEBATES] and
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison)). The Federalist Papers are likewise

inconclusive, sometimes advocating that "republican" meant "representative"
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Papers suggest that representative decision making is an
4 These are
essential component of republican government.
significant themes, interesting in their own light, informative
of our political, cultural, and moral heritage, but no more
reconcilable or subject to ordering principles than the
quotations I set forth at the beginning of this paper.
I do not here contest the accuracy of the characterization
form of the federal government as "republican;" there
the
of
is, however, no basis for understanding the guarantee of a
republican form of government as being designed to place the
U.S. Constitution behind a "judicially" enforceable mandate
that States adopt institutional arrangements similar to those
5 First of all, the two
adopted for the federal government.
governments were conceived of as being fundamentally
different: the federal government was a government of
limited, delegated powers; the state governments were
Separation of
governments of general, reserved powers.
powers/checks and balances as institutional arrangements
were designed to keep the federal government true to its
nature. There simply was no compelling need, nor reason, to
impose like institutional restraints on the States. That does
not mean that the Guarantee Clause was intended to be
superfluous or hortatory. There was a shared sense at the
time that within a federal union of sovereign states it was
necessary that the member states be similarly constituted. It
was recognized that Union would be impossible were one or

See
63-64
(1962) (noting the "split personality" of Publius and observing that the
differences reflected the differing views of the twin authors, Madison and
and sometimes arguing that "republican" meant "non-monarchical."

WILLIAM WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Hamilton).
14. See generally Arthur Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV,
Section 4: A Study in ConstitutionalDesuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 526-27

(1962) (referring to THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 39
(James Madison) and individual views of Madison and Jefferson). The time
frame is also critical; views espoused in 1776 may not reflect views held in 1787.

See JOSEPH ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 9 (2000) (noting that 1787 was a
"counterrevolution" to 1776).
15. I raise this point because I believe the comparison is basic to the
"guaranty thesis" and because the federal form of government was a central
theme to the framers' views as to what constituted a "republican" government.

See WIECEK, supra note 13, at 20; THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (George

Carey ed., 1989) (noting that The FederalistPapers begin with a defense of the
proposed Constitution as conforming "to the true principles of republican
government").
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more of the states to assume a monarchical or aristocratic
form of government," and more importantly, it would be
dangerous to the other states if such events came to pass.'7
Federalist No. 21 repeated this view. i" Indeed as Professor
Bonfield noted, albeit grudgingly, Federalist No. 21
undermines any contention that the Guaranty Clause applies
to peaceful changes in government, such as those
accomplished through the plebiscite:
Out of convention, The Federalist Papers insisted that
without the guarantee, "A successful faction may erect a
tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor
would constitutionally be afforded by the Union...."
After noting the consequences that might ensue from its
absence, an answer was provided for the fear that section
4 would permit "officious interference in the domestic
concerns of the members." It was that the first clause
could be no impediment to reforms of state constitutions
by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceful mode,
this right could only operate on changes to be effected by
violence, but there was an admission that it "would be as
much directed against the usurpations of rulers, as
against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition

16. A point recognized and accepted by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 222 n.48 (1962) (observing that a justiciable controversy involving
the Guaranty Clause may be raised if a state was captured by a permanent
military government). See WIECEK, supra note 13.
The guarantee clause was not meant to solidify republican government
in the mold of existing political institutions. It obviously could not, if
only because the state governmental structures in 1787 were too varied
and too changing to share any but the broadest common
characteristics. In the clause's negative thrust, it was designed to
prohibit monarchical or aristocratic institutions in the states. What
began simply as a revulsion, grounded in experience and necessity,
against rule by kings became transformed into a pledge of popular
government. In its positive aspects the clause assured that innovation
would be possible within a republican framework. It was more than
the Philadelphia Convention's benediction on the extant state
constitutions; it looked to the future, insuring that state governments
would remain responsive to popular will.
Id. at 62-63.
17. See 4 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 13, at 195 (remarks of James Iredell,
later a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, at the North Carolina ratifying
convention). Wiecek also notes the importance the founders attached to the
Guaranty Clause as a means of mutual self-protection enforceable through the
newly formed central government. WIECEK, supra note 13, at 26.
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 125-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ford ed.,
1898).
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The historical argument is further weakened and eroded
when it is recognized that not even the Framers had a
consensus or shared understanding of the form or composition
of a republican government. No sooner had the first national
government been seated than disputes broke out between
those who would come to be called Federalists and those who
would come to be called Republicans. Disagreements between
the parties as to the proper role of government and the
relationship between government and people were profound.
We should not ignore the existence of bitter disagreement
when we attempt to ascribe an understanding or meaning to
text based on our belief that the same understanding or
meaning was shared by a distant drafter or drafters.
Even if we grant that state courts are not barred by the
Supreme Court's justiciability political question doctrine from
entertaining Guaranty Clause challenges to the plebiscite, a
position no court has accepted, ° we are still left with the
profound, unanswered, and probably unanswerable question:
what republican model does the Guarantee Clause
guarantee? Does it reflect the profoundly undemocratic form
of government adopted in 1787, or does it reflect the more
democratic model with universal citizen-adult suffrage that
21
Is republicanism
has evolved over the last 200 years?
viewed as a whole or as a part? In other words, does our view
of republicanism accept or reject the Court's view in Pacific
States that the proper view is the whole, and the case must be
made that the state government as a whole is non-republican

19. Bonfield, supra note 14, at 520.
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145, 1157-59 (Or.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 994 (1997); State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 48182 (Wash. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201 (1997).
21. There is little doubt that the founders were profoundly "undemocratic"
as that term is understood today. Only one branch of the federal government
(House of Representatives) was to be elected by the "people." The "people" were
themselves a discrete minority of the inhabitants of the newly formed United
States, excluding not only slaves and women but most adult males. Universal
white adult enfranchisement would not occur until the advent of Jacksonian
democracy in the 1820s. The Founders saw democracy and despotism as
connected; the former necessarily led to the latter. See WIECEK, supra note 13,
at 19. For a criticism of the anti-democratic tone of the "guaranty thesis," see
Akhil Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the DenominatorProblem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
749 (1994).

980

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

before the Guaranty Clause would be applied." Requiring
that the state as a whole be the proper focus would likely
require a court to accept or reject the use of the plebiscite in
toto. I do not understand the thesis to make this broad
claim,23 but I do not see how the Guaranty Clause can be used
as a scalpel rather than a meat cleaver if guarantee refers to
the whole structure of state government, not a discrete part.
The problem is that the thesis operates on the assumption
that a state government can be republican in the whole, but
non-republican as to a discrete part. I believe that such an
assumption has no grounding in the historical record. More
significantly, its adoption would be cause for mischief. Any
law-making procedure outside the scope of republican elected
bodies would be subject to challenge under the "guaranty
thesis." For example, state laws providing for the popular
election of Presidential Electors raise a claim of nonrepublican vice.24 The same could be said for popular election
of judges. Use of the Guaranty Clause to challenge these
established practices would raise a firestorm of popular
protest that would, in my view, do little good and much harm
to state courts that would be called upon to apply the
"guaranty thesis" to these issues in a principled
manner.
The second method of advancing the "guaranty thesis's"
substantive prong is to argue that the Guaranty Clause
reflects evolving ideals of republican government that reflect
contemporary needs and values. To suggest this approach is,
of course, to identify its prime difficulty. Legal Realism is
22. The point is developed in greater detail by Sirico, supra note 13, at 65152.
23. Justice Linde argues in his paper prepared for this Conference: "[Tihe
task for judges is not to define 'republican government' as a Platonic form but to
recognize when a particular feature is not republican." Hans A. Linde, State
Courts and Republican Government, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 951, 955-56
(2001).
24. The claim that the practice violates the norm of "republicanism" as
announced by the "guaranty thesis" is enhanced by the fact that the Founders
specifically rejected proposals to elect the President by popular vote.
25. I say this notwithstanding my own view that contested judicial elections
are a pernicious intrusion on the independence of the judiciary from popular
influence. It is enough that judges read about election results; judicial decisions
should not be secured directly by election results. Yet, I am constrained to add
that my dislike of the practice does not persuade me that popular election of
judges is non-republican, much less that it warrants redress through Article IV,
section 4. As Daniel Webster once noted: "A strong conviction that something
must be done is the parent of many bad measures."
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more attractive to legal commentators than judges. Rare is
the judge who acknowledges that his or her construction of
constitutional text is controlled by values alien to those who
drafted and ratified the text.
Constitutions must, of course, be dynamic and have the
capacity to respond to new situations not seen, or even
foreseeable, by the drafters and ratifiers. This delicate
balance is maintained by extending the core meaning of the
original text, as understood and defined by the courts, to the
new situation presented. How fast and how honestly this
process is conducted cannot be defined. The Constitution, as
interpreted by the Court, means many things today that one
suspects would surprise those who were there at the
beginning. Some find this dismaying, others exhilarating.
Yet, even the latter will acknowledge the need to maintain a
bridge to the past if we are to maintain a meaningful
distinction between legislative and judicial power.
A bold claim that the Guaranty Clause encompasses
modern views of civic republicanism-itself a debated
concept-is unlikely to be accepted by modern courts. One
can argue that a particular model of modern civic
republicanism more closely coheres with the republican model
held by the drafters and should be adopted for that reason.
That argument brings us back, however, to the historical
argument, which, I have argued, does not support the view
that the Constitution entrenched a particular model or
standard of republican government on the states.
We should not forget that the Constitution was meant
primarily for those who lived in the newly independent States
in 1787. Their situation was not that of inhabitants of a
dominant superpower. The States were divided by regional
differences, subject to substantial debt to British and Dutch
bankers, confronted by Spanish forces in the South and West,
British forces in the North, hostile Native Americans
26
everywhere, rebellions at home, and indifference abroad.
Article IV, Section 4, which includes the Guaranty Clause,
was a natural expression of a concern that a State may need
assistance, due to external or internal pressures that would
26. See WIECEK, supra note 13, at 22 (prevent tyranny), 39-40 (concern over

Shay's Rebellion and fear of internal commotions), 38 (concern over British

agents in Canada fomenting insurrection), 42-46 (concern over creation of a

monarchy).
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threaten its very ability to function as a State in the form and
manner those alive at the time experienced and expected. It
is a misapplication of constitutional text to take terms and
provisions that had a historical relevance and apply them to a
different situation that does not meaningfully share that
historical context.
The mistake made in arguing for a
grandiose view of the Guaranty Clause is no different from
those who have a grandiose vision of the Second
Amendment.2 7 Both groups-I believe the "guaranty thesis"
articulates a "grandiose" view-seek to use constitutional text
for ends that are quite removed from those the drafters and
ratifiers had in mind. That is not per se bad-I am not
arguing that we should be prisoners of text or the precise
evils text was designed to avoid. We should not, however,
seek to carry the day by an argument to history that will not
support the claims made.
The procedural prong of the "guaranty thesis" makes the
claim that plebiscites raise severe risks to vulnerable groups
that are different in kind from the risks deliberative bodies
pose to these vulnerable groups. Deliberative bodies contain
safeguards against majoritarian excess. These safeguards
include consensus building, reliance on the quality and
quantity of constituent pressure, and an awareness of
constitutional guarantees which in the aggregate point,
direct, and encourage elected representatives to govern for
the public good.28 Because these safeguards exist, courts may
27. Like the aggressive proponents of the Second Amendment, the
proponents of the Guaranty Clause read that clause in isolation from the rest of
the text. Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution provides: "The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,
and shall protect each of them against Invasion, and on the Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence." The first clause is commonly referred to as the
Guarantee Clause. The second clause, however, suggests the context in which
the guaranty was made that provides little support for reading the first clause
broadly.
28. See Eule, supra note 10, at 1526 (discussing the "representative filter");
cf. Bell, supra note 7, at 19-20:
Appeals to prejudice, oversimplification of the issues, and exploitation
of legitimate concerns by promising simplistic solutions to complex
problems often characterize referendum and initiative campaigns. Of
course, politicians, too, may offer quick cure-alls to gin electoral
support and may spend millions on election campaigns that are as
likely to obfuscate as to elucidate the issues. But we vote politicians
into office, not into law. Once in office, they may become well-informed,
responsible representatives; at the least, their excesses may be
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presume that the legislation has been adjusted internally to
address the issue of disparate effects as part of the "give and
take" of the legislative process. Consequently, courts need
only police those instances where the normal "give and take"
does not operate-as, for example, when the court discerns a
discriminatory intent on the part of the majority against the
Judicial review of legislation coming from
minority.
deliberative bodies is consistent with this view.29
From the viewpoint of the "guaranty thesis," however,
the normal checks and balances inherent in deliberative,
representative bodies are missing when direct democracy is
used to enact law. Voting is a singular, isolating experience.
A voter can privately and deliberately seek to advance his
own self-interest, his neighbor's adverse interest, or both.
Unlike deliberative, representative bodies, there is no
accountability for one's vote; indeed, a voter can publicly state
that he or she will vote one way, but vote the other way in the
voting booth and no one will know.3" According to the thesis,
voter autonomy and ballot secrecy raise the likelihood that
ballot propositions will operate, in fact, to burden vulnerable
For this reason, the thesis would subject
minorities.
legislation enacted by plebiscites that disparately affect
vulnerable minorities to a stricter standard of review than
would be applied were legislation, identical to the ballot
proposition, enacted by a deliberative, representative body.
The fundamental question is whether we should allow
our concerns for the integrity of the law making process to
influence the decision whether law, independent of its
content, should be respected. The "guaranty thesis" suggests
that concerns over the integrity of plebiscites justify that laws
thereby enacted be subjected to harsher scrutiny than laws
enacted by representative institutions. The thesis does not
operate under the illusion that the legislative process of
deliberative, representative bodies is immune from
majoritarian excess; representative bodies have at times
exhibited a discomforting refusal to act with integrity.31 The
curtailed by the checks and balances of the political process.
Id. (citation omitted).
29. See Eule, supra note 10, at 1532-39.
30. See Linde, Forgotten Law, supra note 11, at 1741-45.
31. Ironically, not cravenly following public opinion polls does not
necessarily generate either popular or academic kudos, as demonstrated by the
substantial disapproval visited on congressional republicans for their
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thesis operates on the assumption that this tendency infects
to a greater extent the plebiscite. Dissimilar treatment is not
urged because of differences in the actuality of abuse; we are
provided no empirical data by which we can measure the
degree of deviation from the desired norm or the extent to
which, in fact, one method of decision making is more
principled than another." Rather, the gradations of evil are
based on the potential for abuse. The thesis sees in the
representative institutions and their internal processes the
safeguards
mentioned earlier that caution against
majoritarian excesses. These safeguards are found to be
altogether absent in the context of plebiscites, and
correspondingly, the thesis would subject plebiscites to the
equivalent of a judicial "hard look."
I do not believe it is surprising that certain qualities
present in connection with one form of decision making might
not be present in an altogether different form of decision
making. The question is whether these identified differences
are really significant; do they really affect the integrity of the
process; and if so, can they be redressed through the remedy
of a judicial "hard look?" The problem would be difficult
enough if we were addressing a case in which one form of
decision making was identified as generating more instances
of abuse. In such a case, one would question whether the
factors identified as critical to the process were merely
correlative or causal.
In the context presented by the
"guaranty thesis," the problem is abstracted. Anecdotal
information and case studies are legion, 3 but good empirical
data comparing the "quality" of decision making accomplished
by the plebiscite with that of representative institutions is
lacking. This is not surprising. Few controversial political
disputes are resolvable by facts rather than values. This
unrelenting attacks on former President Clinton-attacks that persisted in the
face of acknowledgment that the attacks were unpopular and politically
counterproductive.
32. See Phillip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 486 (suggesting that
the presumptions are descriptive in nature and thus, subject to criticism as
lacking empirical support).
33. See DAVID BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED (2000); JOHN JUDIS,
PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ELITES, SPECIAL INTERESTS, AND THE
BETRAYAL OF THE PUBLIC TRUST (2000); ELIZABETH GERBER, THE POPULIST
PARADOX (1999); THOMAS CRONIN & M.J. ROSSANT, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM & RECALL (1999).
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points out, however, the care we should exercise before we
render constitutional decisions on fluid fact patterns and
selective collection of facts. 4 We must, in the absence of any
sound data, forecast the possible incidence of abuse. On that
basis alone we must then find that a form of decision making
that possesses those certain identified factors is less likely to
be abusive or abused (i.e., improperly subject to majoritarian
excesses) than is a system of decision making that does not
possess those factors. I find the proof necessary to sustain
the thesis unavailing and, I suspect, unavailable except as a
reflection of one's already formed views of the superiority of
certain forms of decision making over others. Ultimately the
thesis fails, for its assumption of the superiority of
representative decision making over the plebiscite can neither
be proven nor disproven. Hence, it can provide no real
support for a principled decision to subject one form of
decision making to a different level of scrutiny than is
rendered to the other, at least to the extent the different
treatment is predicated on perceived characteristics of each
form.
The "guaranty thesis" invokes the spectre of
"majoritarian excesses" as a justification for a judicial "hard
I will concede that
look" at plebiscite legislation.
"majoritarian excess" is not only possible, but, on occasion, a
reality. But all forms of decision making possess the
potential for abuse and, on occasion, that potential is realized.
The difficulty is in defining what we mean by "excess." If the
thesis is suggesting that certain types of legislation (i.e., that
within the four corners of the Carolene Products footnote35
relating to the relative fitness of the judicial and legislative
branches to address certain types of problems) are to receive
a judicial "hard look," that point is unremarkable.
Constitutional guarantees can be no more abrogated by the
34. See BRODER, supra note 33. An esteemed reporter, the bulk of Broder's
book reflects a balanced account of recent usage of ballot propositions,
emphasizing experiences in California and Oregon in the 1990s. Yet, in the
final chapter of the book, when the reporter becomes an editorial writer, his
criticism of ballot propositions becomes divorced from his conclusions. The
nuance and subtlety of the earlier chapters is replaced by unsubstantiated
conclusion. Having examined the pros and the cons of ballot propositions with
exemplary fairness and an eye for detail, Broder concludes that the con position
prevails, but then fails to tell us why.
35. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See
generally LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 108-14 (1975).
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people directly than through their representatives. Yet, I
understand the "guaranty thesis" to be making a far broader
statement. "Majoritarian excess" lies in the very fact that the
plebiscite exists and serves as a mechanism to bypass
representative institutions. This fact alone, in my estimation,
serves as the driving force behind the judicial "hard look" at
ballot propositions that proponents of the thesis demand.
The "hard look" gloss bears some resemblance to the
"hard look" doctrine that emerged in the 1970s as a
methodology for judicial review of agency decision making.
The doctrine was expressive of a review function that was
artfully described as both "narrow" on the one hand, and
"probing," "searching," and "careful" on the other. 6
The
difficulty with applying a "hard look" doctrine in the context
of plebiscites is that any "hard look" doctrine presupposes
that one knows what one is looking for. In the administrative
law context, the search was for evidence of reasoned "on the
record" decision making by the agency. If the agency failed,
in the court's estimation, to have exercised a sound discretion,
the agency's decision was set aside. Of course, in the context
of agency decision making the "hard look" doctrine can be
justified as a means of assuring that the decision maker has
acted consistent with the law that authorizes the decision
maker to decide in the first instance.
But what law
authorizes the application of the "hard look" doctrine to
plebiscites? On what basis do courts assume the role of
determining whether the voters exercised a "sound"
judgment? By what right do courts assume the right to
declare properly enacted legislation invalid because in the
mind or opinion of the judge, the enactment is ill advised,
wrongheaded, or just plain stupid. I do not doubt for a
moment that many of us would like the ability to exercise
such a power. I state with great confidence that few, if any, of
us would want to confer such power in someone other than
ourselves.
Before we embark on a crusade to rein in the plebiscite
by the use of judicial "hard looks," we should ask ourselves
why is a "hard look" needed. Why are the existing controls on
the plebiscite inadequate? Limitations on plebiscites already
36. See Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
37. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923.
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exist and it is unclear what additional, needed protections
would be provided by recourse to the Guaranty Clause.
Plebiscites must deal with appropriate legislative matters.
Plebiscites cannot address matters that affect only a few or a
distinct group to the extent that we would characterize the
process as "adjudicative" or "quasi-adjudicative."3 8 Likewise,
the plebiscite, if it is too directly focused at a particular evil,
may be struck down as a Bill of Attainder. Just as we cannot
have "trial by legislature" we should not use plebiscites to
have "trial by the electorate."39
Courts have historically policed the plebiscite to insure
that certain information, e.g., title, description, voter
pamphlet, is accurate." Courts have also controlled the ballot
proposition itself insuring that it adheres to limits that apply
to its use, such as single subject requirements4 and
prohibitions on wholesale revision of law through plebiscites.42
38. See Bi-Metalic Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1975).
Compare City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976)
(legislative-14th Amendment does not apply), with Washington v. Roberg, 278
U.S. 116 (1928) (adjudicative-14th Amendment applies). In Roberg the
ordinance permitted the establishment of homes for the aged in residential
areas only on the written consent of two-thirds of the property owners within
400 feet of the proposed facility. In Eastlake the matter (zoning change) was
submitted to the entire electorate.
39. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10-6 (2d ed.

1988).
40. See Oregonians for Nuclear Safeguards v. Myers, 554 P.2d 172 (Or.
1976) (ordering certain misleading and unfair passages deleted from the voters'
pamphlet). See generally Comment, Avoidance of an Election or Referendum
When the ElectorateHas Been Misled, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1957).
41. Many proponents of the "guaranty thesis," including Justice Linde,
bemoan the use of the plebiscite to erect barriers to state funding of "needed"
services. See Linde, supra note 23 (criticizing initiatives, such as California's
Proposition 13, which amend a state's constitution to restrict taxes and levels of
spending). Yet, the problem is more self-inflicted than externally compelled.
The California Supreme Court chose to apply an extremely liberal single subject
test. See James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct
Democracy to State ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43,
51-54 (1983) (critiquing loose and liberal California interpretation of the single
subject requirement). When state courts take a sensible approach towards the
single subject requirement, the type of initiative adherents to the "guaranty
thesis" fear are avoided. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 587 v. State,
11 P.3d 762 (Wash. 2000) (holding that the initiative, which sought to limit
license fee tabs and require voter approval of future state and local tax
increases, violated single subject requirement).
42. See Fischer, supra note 41, at 50-51 (discussing the approaches of
several jurisdictions to distinguish between the proper use of the initiative to
amend the state constitution versus its improper use to revise the state
constitution).
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It may be argued that these controls are inadequate, that
they fail to prevent pernicious ballot propositions from being
placed before the electorate.
If the problem is under
enforcement of existing rules, what leads proponents of strict
scrutiny through judicial "hard looks" to believe that judicial
tolerance will suddenly be replaced with judicial rigor?" If
the problem is that the constraints, even when properly
enforced, are themselves inadequate, then the issue becomes
whether another barrier or control should be placed on
plebiscites in addition to the specific barriers and controls
found in the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment?
This last point becomes, for me, the heart of the debate.
If we put all the historical arguments aside, if we accept that
a judicial "hard look" doctrine can exist and be implemented,
we might still ask whether the "guaranty thesis's" suggestion
of judicial safeguarding of a state's republican institutions is
a good idea, independent of whether it is constitutionally
defensible.
Law, like nature, abhors a vacuum.
The
Guaranty Clause is, after all, a broad statement and much
can, no doubt, be justified by its invocation once it is
perceived that the desired result is in furtherance of a "good
public policy." Modern advocates of the "guaranty thesis" are
not the first to see in the Guaranty Clause a great power that
could be harnessed to achieve the drivers' view of the public
good. Senator Charles Sumner had a similar dream in 1867:
"It is a clause which is like a sleeping giant in the
Constitution, never until this recent war awakened, but now
it comes forward with a giant's power .... There is no clause
which gives to Congress such supreme power over the States
as that clause."" Senator Sumner was, of course, incorrect.
The Guaranty Clause did not assume any positive role in
defining state-federal relations, at that time45 or later. A
43. This is the "crocodile in the bathtub" fear made famous by the late, and
much missed, Justice Otto Kaus. See Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52, 58 (reporting Justice Kaus's comments, in the
aftermath of a successful political effort to deny reelection to three targeted
Justices of the California Supreme Court, that ignoring the political
consequences of prominent decisions was akin to ignoring crocodiles in your
bathtub); see also Gerald Uelmen, Otto Kaus and the Crocodile, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 971, 973-74 (1997). The "underenforcement" problem also raises a
question of state court power which I address infra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text.
44. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867).
45. See WIECEK, supra note 13, at 232-36.

20011

PLEBISCITES

989

more "romantic" characterization would be that the Clause is
a sleeping beauty who only awaits the kiss of her Prince
(Justice Linde seems to have volunteered for the role) to
awaken her from a long slumber (perhaps "coma" is a more
apt characterization).
Involving courts in the supervision of state institutional
arrangements would, in my estimation, be unwise. If such
involvement can be justified based on the potential for abuse,
must not such interference be demanded when actual abuse
The judiciary has consistently resisted such
is shown?
46
Would courts be able to do so if the "guaranty
claims.
thesis" were accepted? I do not demean the importance of
judicial review to suggest that there may be limits to its
capacity to do good if it is to do well. At some point the
popularly elected branches and the people must be left to
enjoy the benefits or suffer the consequences of their actions."
In his paper prepared for this Conference, Justice Linde
has refined and expanded his central argument that state
courts are not barred by the Court's decision in Pacific States
from enforcing the Guaranty Clause against direct
Justice Linde's paper addresses the problem
legislation.
46. See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937) (refusing to inquire
whether the legislature made any effort to obtain facts supporting the
legislation adopted: "[T]he legislature... is presumed to know the needs of the
people of the State. Whether or not special inquiries should be made is a matter
left to legislative discretion."); United States v. Balin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892)
(refusing to question the accuracy of the speaker's count of the quorum);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (refusing to set aside statute
tainted with bribery).
47. Unfortunately, I believe that much of the concern voiced by the
proponents of the "guaranty thesis" is based on a profound lack of trust in the
abilities and competence of voters. See BRODER, supra note 33, at 230 (noting
the attitude of some of the governing elite who believe that most Americans are
too ill-informed to make wise decisions on important issues). This attitude was
captured in the majority panel opinion in Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 956-63
(9th Cir. 1997), which held that Proposition 140 (which imposed lifetime term
limits on legislators) had not been fully comprehended by California voters. The
panel decision was subsequently reversed by the Ninth Circuit in an en banc
decision. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that voters
were given sufficient notice of the effect of the initiative to make an effective
choice), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998).
48. See Linde, supra note 23. I believe the problem with the "guaranty
thesis" has earlier antecedents in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), in
which rival factions competed for control of the government of Rhode Island.
See WIECEK, supra note 13, at 86-129 (discussing the decision in its political
and historical contexts). If the Court would not intervene when the entirety of a
state's government was under attack and resisting removal, it is questionable
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somewhat differently from what I have characterized as the
"guaranty thesis." As noted earlier, that thesis,
owing here
primarily to the writings of Professor Eule,49 emphasized the
potential that plebiscites could be used to disadvantage
insular and vulnerable minorities. That potential could be
exploited because of the deference and limited review courts
afford legislation that does not demonstrate a discriminatory
purpose or intent. Professor Eule and others feared that
many voters, and sponsors of ballot propositions, would have
that intent, but the secretive, isolating nature of voting would
mask that reality from the judicial view. Ballot propositions
could thus, disparately effect minorities, but would, under
existing law, escape serious judicial review."
Justice Linde's paper expresses a different concern: direct
legislation threatens the structural integrity of state
republican institutions when direct legislation is placed
beyond the legislature's power to repeal, amend, or correct
laws enacted through the plebiscite.5 Legislators are not, in
Justice Linde's view, mere "potted plants" condemned to sit
idly by while critical governmental decisions are made by
non-republican actors. The use of direct democracy to place
voter enacted legislation beyond the reach of elected
representatives constitutes, in Justice Linde's view, an
impermissible nullification of the republican guarantee
contained in Article IV, Section 4."
I believe that the criticisms many commentators have
directed at direct democracy through the plebiscite are well
directed and well documented. 3 There is little doubt that the
plebiscite has traveled far from its Progressive roots.
Plebiscites were once envisioned as allowing the great mass of
whether lesser slights would create a justiciable case or controversy.
Nonetheless, I will argue the issue on the terms laid down by Justice Linde. I
will also concede that Luther is open to a narrower interpretation than I would
give it.
49. See Eule, supra note 10.
50. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
51. See Linde, supra note 23. I would assume that Justice Linde would
treat a proposal that the people be allowed to "instruct" their representatives as
being non-republican. Such a proposal was rejected by the First Congress,
largely on the basis that it was inconsistent with the republican model adopted
by the Constitution. See Cook v. Gralike, 529 U.S. 1065 (2001) (discussing the
reasoning for rejecting a proposed amendment that citizens have a right to
instruct members of Congress).
52. See Linde, supra note 23.
53. See supra note 33.
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citizens to bypass corrupt legislatures controlled by bosses
and parties beholden to their own or narrow "special
Modern plebiscites appear with distressing
interests."5 4
frequency to reflect the interests of groups with intense
Nor do I find the
rather than broad-based preferences.5
remedies suggested by Justice Linde to restrict the nonlegislation-permitting
of direct
aspects
republican
legislatures to treat voter enacted legislation the same as
legislature enacted legislation -to be unattractive. Yet,
while I see the benefits of restricting direct statutory
legislation, I am unpersuaded that the benefit can be
achieved through judicial application of the Guaranty Clause
because the restraints imposed by Pacific States are not as
facile to slip as Justice Linde contends.
Justice Linde, reading Pacific States narrowly, argues
that the decision did not purport to reject state court
decisions that had considered and applied the Guaranty
Clause to the plebiscite. I am less sanguine than Justice
Linde that his view is correct. As noted previously, I read
Pacific States as a commitment of Guaranty Clause questions
to the federal representative body. At the root, Justice Linde
and I disagree over the meaning of the Court's treatment of
the Guaranty Clause question as "nonjusticiable" in Pacific
States. While I agree with Justice Linde that Pacific States
does not read the Guaranty Clause out of the Constitution; I
do believe, however, that Pacific States reads the judicial
power out of the Guaranty Clause.

54. I use "special interests" in the pejorative

sense intended by the

Progressives. "Special interests" are generally seen as being opposed to the
"public interest," although what is "special" and what is "public" tends to vary
based on the viewpoint and values of the person doing the classifying.
55. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter"
Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1562 (1999).
For purposes of this analysis, one interesting characteristic of the
groups that succeed at direct lawmaking is that they tend to focus on
one or a few issues on which their members have intense preferences.
Accordingly, they are seldom strong enough to elect their own

candidates, but they can influence elections by convincing the
candidates of the major parties to support their positions.
Id.
56. I hope I am not mischaracterizing or unduly limiting Justice Linde's
He emphasizes these objections to current usages of direct
objections.
legislation (See Linde, supra note 23) and I infer that were the objections
removed, direct legislation would not violate republican norms as guaranteed by

Article IV,section 4.
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Pacific States is simply unsupportive of Justice Linde's
gloss. The opinion repeatedly states that the power to enforce
the Guaranty Clause is entrusted to Congress, not the
courts.5 7 Justice Linde necessarily relies on the fact that the
Court did not reverse or vacate the Oregon Supreme Court
decision that the plebiscite did not violate the Guaranty
Clause; rather, the Court dismissed the matter "for want of
jurisdiction.""8 This disposition is read as being susceptible to
the reading that the Court was speaking solely to the power
of federal courts, and not to the power of state courts, to
enforce Article IV, Section 4.
It must be observed that it is a strange federal right-for
Justice Linde does not argue that the Guaranty Clause has a
non-federal basis-that finds exclusive judicial enforcement
in state courts, and not federal courts. Congress, exercising
its jurisdiction under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 9 and
Article III, Section 1 over inferior courts, could prescribe that
in certain cases federal rights must be enforced only in state
courts, but as far as I can discern it has not done so.u9 There
is, however, no constitutionally mandated corollary-aside
from the one Justice Linde reads into Article IV, Section 4
and finds in Pacific States.
It is not correct, however, to read the Court's disposition
of Pacific States so broadly. There is no consistent method
used by the Court to resolve justiciability dispositions. In
part this is a consequence of the long-standing concern by the
Justices over the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court." In
other part, this is a consequence of the fact that justiciability
57. For example, after stating the argument that the non-republican nature
of the plebiscite states a justiciable claim, the Court replied:
We shall not stop to consider the text to point out how absolutely
barren it is of support for the contentions sought to be based upon it,
since the repugnancy of those contentions to the letter and spirit of that
text is so conclusively established by prior decisions of this court as to
cause the matter to be absolutely foreclosed.
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 142-43. The entirety of
the unanimous opinion is of this tenor.
58. See id. at 151.
59. Whether Congress could, consistent with the Constitution, commit
judicial review of federal rights claims exclusively to state courts is a matter of
debate.
The arguments are collected in PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART &
WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 366-424 (3d ed.
1988).
60. See ROBERT STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE §§ 3.1-3.6 (6th ed.
1986).
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concerns arise in many different ways." While vacation of the
state court decision may be the usual disposition in cases of
mootness, 62 there is no pattern identifiable for cases raising
the political question doctrine.
We should also be careful before we build a doctrine on a
point never expressly considered by the Court. Pacific States
does not affirmatively support the proposition that state
courts possess the power to enforce the Guaranty Clause.
Language used in any opinion must be understood in light of
the facts and issues before the court; and the opinion is not
authority for a proposition not considered. Of course, Justice
Linde may respond that the opposite is also true; issues not
6
expressly considered are not foreclosed. " I believe, however,
that Justice Linde's case must rely on more than negative
It requires an affirmative showing that the
inference.
concerns, which caused the Court in Pacific States and in
practically all other Guaranty Clause cases to find the issue
inappropriate for federal court resolution, are not present or
abated when state courts are involved. Justice Linde has not
Moreover, even if the case for state
made that case.
enforcement could be sustained, it would then raise the
anomalous problem that state courts would be the final
arbiters of federal law-a view rejected by the Court in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.6 State court decisions applying
the Guaranty Clause to state political arrangements would
also be immune from political correction, other than by
65
I
federal constitutional amendment-a dubious position.
61. See 13A CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §

3534 (1984).
62. See STERN ET AL., supra note 60, § 18.5.
63. See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (arguing "[q]uestions
which merely lurk in the record are not resolved, and no resolution of them may
be inferred").
See generally Charles Warren,
64. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
Court of the United States-A
Supreme
the
on
Attacks
Judicial
and
Legislative
History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 47 AM. L. REV.
1, 161 (1963).
65. Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg expressed a similar concern with state
court efforts to find broader federal rights than the Court was willing to
recognize. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 340, 34344 (1978) (reviewing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st
ed. 1978)). In the second edition, Professor Tribe more closely aligned himself
with

Justice

Ginsburg's

views.

See

LAURENCE

TRIBE,

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 40-41 & n.55 (2d ed. 1988); see also Donald Beschle,
Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and the Background Right to
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believe these considerations strongly caution against adoption
of Justice Linde's embellishment of the "guaranty thesis" that
vests state courts with the power to enforce a federal "claim"
the Court has found to be outside the power of federal courts
to enforce.
Pacific States holds that the Constitution commits the
republican guarantee to Congress, not the courts. After
Pacific States, the Guaranty Clause must be read as if the
words "United States" means "Congress." If I am correct, and
I know Justice Linde and others will argue that I am not, 66
their efforts to expand the decision making bodies that can
consider Guaranty Clause questions beyond Congress must
Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L.J. 539 (1988).
The right of the citizen to effective implementation of democratic
outcomes is, of course, properly subordinated to the individual rights
created by the Constitution, which may be asserted against majorities.
The scope of those rights will undoubtedly continue to be the source of
sharp controversy. Expansion of individual rights may well reflect the
evolving understanding of those rights not only by courts, but by the
people as a whole. Such outcomes are clearly consistent with the
overall constitutional scheme.
However, expansive readings of
individual rights provisions which are idiosyncratic, and which depart
from contemporary views of what the provision means nationwide, not
only interfere with the utilitarian benefits derived from the invalidated
government practice, but on a deeper level deprive the citizens of the
state involved of their right to effectively govern themselves within
constitutional limits. It is this background right to an effective
democracy within constitutional limits, the explicit recognition of which
would have a significant effect on constitutional interpretation as a
whole, which provides the foundation for the value of uniformity in
constitutional interpretation.
Id. at 541-42.
66. Justice Linde's argument finds some support in Wiecek's review of the
events leading to the adoption of the Guaranty Clause. See WIECEK, supra note
13, at 59 (arguing that the "guarantee of a republican form of government...
was a positive, prophylactic guarantee, to be secured by the civil branches of the
federal government"); id. (arguing that "the more generalized guarantee clause
could be read as an authorization for Congress, the President, or the courts to
act"). The fact is that the Guaranty Clause has not been so read by the Court.
The only decision by the Court which even intimates a judicial role for the
Guaranty Clause is Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1910), which addressed a
provision in the Act admitting Oklahoma as a State that required that the State
Capitol remain at Guthrie until 1913. The requirement was struck down and
the objection that the issue presented a political question under the republican
guaranty was, as Wiecek noted, "brushed aside." WIECEK, supra note 13, at
239. Yet, the decision in Coyle is somewhat enigmatic and reflects more on
equal treatment of the States and the ability of Congress to prescribe conditions
for admission that could not be imposed on the States qua States. Coyle is
hardly a ringing endorsement of a vibrant judicial role in enforcing the
republican guaranty.
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necessarily fail. When the Constitution, as written or as
interpreted, vests decision making in a particular body, that
vesting is exclusive. This point was illustrated in Hawke v.
Smith.67 In Hawke the Court held that the Constitution's
commitment of amendment to the state legislature in Article
V did not permit intrusion by citizen referendum.
Concededly, the term "Legislature" expressly appears in
Article V and this fact was relied on by the Court in Hawke,
and more recently in U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton," as
concentrating the power to the designated body exclusively.
Yet, the force of the argument is strictly literal and ignores
the fact that the Court in Pacific States rendered a definition
That meaning
declaration of what the text meant.
69
necessarily becomes part of the text itself.
If my reading of Pacific States is correct and the decision
represents a commitment of the power to enforce the
Guaranty Clause exclusively to Congress, then there is
necessarily no power possessed by the States (or state courts)
of Guaranty Clause enforcement. Congress could perhaps
delegate the power to the courts, but I do not understand
Justice Linde to be making that argument, so I will not. The
effect, however, of Pacific States's commitment of Guaranty
Clause enforcement to the Congress is that it strips the
judiciary of any equivalent power.
Justice Linde's assertion that state courts have the power
to enforce the Guaranty Clause has no constitutional
mooring. It is not a power reserved by the States. The
67. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
68. 514 U.S. 799 (1995).

69. It strikes me as unusual that the Supremacy Clause that Justice Linde
the
would invoke to give state court judges the power and right to apply
call
to
invoked
selectively
be
can
Guaranty Clause to state ballot propositions
upon the text of the Constitution but not the law of the text as developed by the
Court. The distinction may be justified if the Court's decision making in the
Guaranty Clause area was centrally based on the view that the disputes were
prudentially non-justiciable. Pacific States holds that the Constitution commits
whatever power the Guaranty Clause confers to Congress. That form of
decision making, whether it is labeled "political question" or "justiciable," is
itself a Constitution-interpreting decision which precludes state court
usurpation of federal power. See Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). Professor Henkin noted that the political
question doctrine, properly applied, represents a judicial decision that a matter
has been committed to one of the political branches for decision making. See id.
at 599 (arguing that "a political question is one in which the courts forego their
unique and paramount function of judicial review of constitutionality").
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Guaranty Clause is a federal power created by the
Constitution."° As noted in Thornton, "As we have frequently
noted, '[t]he States unquestionably do retain a significant
measure of sovereign authority. They do so, however, only to
the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of
their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government."'
Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the power to add
qualifications is not part of the original powers of sovereignty
that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States.
Petitioners' Tenth Amendment argument misconceives the
nature of the right at issue because that Amendment could
only "reserve" that which existed before. "As Justice Story
recognized, 'the states can exercise no powers whatsoever,
which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national
government, which the constitution does not delegate to
them ....
No state can say, that it has reserved, what it
never possessed."'' 1
While Thornton obviously addresses the question of
powers reserved by the States under the Tenth Amendment,
the principle articulated is applicable here. The Constitution
does not confer on state courts a power the Court has held is
constitutionally committed to a political branch to the
exclusion of the judiciary.
The fact that the Guaranty Clause may be underenforced is not a legitimate basis for encouraging state court
enforcement of a broader right than federal law recognizes.
When the right is of federal origin-as is the case with the
70. See WIECEK, supra note 13, at 15 (referring to the Virginia Plan
noting that "the guarantee prohibited monarchical forms of government and
and
assured that the powers of the national government would be used to
proscribe
them"); id. (noting that "Madison insisted that the federal government
needed
some coercive authority over the states"); id. at 60-62 (discussing changes
in the
guarantee provision accomplished by the Committee of Detail that rejected
an
effort to restrict the guarantee to the mutual support approach of the
Articles of
Confederation). Wiecek observes:
The Workings of the Committee and the intentions of its members can
be inferred to a great extent from the Randolph-Rutledge working
outline that guided the Committee in preparing its drafts for
submission to the Convention. From this document it appears that the
Committee intended the guarantee clause to be a grant of power to the
federal government, not dependent on the will of the state
governments ....
Id. at 60.
71. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 801-02 (citation omitted).
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Guaranty Clause-the entire range of the right is determined
2
by federal law. The point was adopted in Oregon v. Hass
when Oregon sought to provide a broader constitutional
73 The Court
guarantee than that recognized by the Court.
rejected Oregon's efforts and stated, "[A] state may not
impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal
constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from
The States were not barred from
imposing them."74
75
recognizing a broader right under their own constitutions.
They were, however, constrained from adding to federal
rights in a manner inconsistent with the Court's treatment of
the scope of the federal right. If there is error in the
definition of the right, it is for the Court to correct, not the
States.
I am not prepared to state that the plebiscite is socially
good or bad, the Emerson and Burke quotes at the beginning
of this paper notwithstanding. I doubt that the people of a
jurisdiction that has not adopted the plebiscite are
necessarily any better or worse off than the people of a
jurisdiction that has. At least I see nothing in the use of the
plebiscite in the last ten to twenty years that suggests it
poses a danger to the Republic or that it is a pernicious, as
opposed to unwise, method of effecting a change in law. The
case has not been made that there is a demonstrated need,
here or elsewhere, that all political questions that can also be
framed as legal disputes by reference to capaciously
construed language in the Constitution must be decided on
the merits by courts. Let us consider that committing the
preservation of republican institutions may be better and
more sensibly served by locating that power in a
representative institution-the Congress-rather than the
most non representative and non republican branch-the
Judiciary.
I can think of no better end to my ruminations on this
72. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
73. The issue involved Oregon's efforts to prohibit use for impeachment
purposes of statements taken in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights.
The use for impeachment purposes had been authorized in Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
74. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (emphasis added).
75. This point served as the basis for an influential article by Justice
William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Brennan.
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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topic than to quote from the preeminent legal scholar on the
Guaranty Clause-Professor Wiecek:
It might have been argued-and it was by a few Antifederalists in the ratification debates of 1788-1789-that
the word "republican" in the guarantee clause was a
sonorous but meaningless adjective. Possibly, the word
was not meant to have any strictly definable significance.
Few of the delegates in Philadelphia tried to explain
precisely the concept of republican government; the
document they drafted abounds in vague words and
phrases. The Convention was not a "seminar in analytic
philosophy or linguistic analysis."
Because the
Constitution is so much the product of compromise, we
run a danger of reading history backward when we
construe it, seeing meanings in words and phrases that
would surprise the men who used them. An attempt to
find conceptual precision in a document whose most
important immediate virtue had to be its acceptability
may be misleading.
Thus the word "republican" may well not have had any
single and universal denotation to the men who inserted it
into the guarantee clause. It may, in fact, have had no
meaning at all. John Adams complained late in life that
"the word republic as it is used, may signify anything,
everything, or nothing." He insisted that he "never
understood" what the guarantee of republican government
meant; "and I believe no man ever did or ever will."76

76. WIECEK, supra note 13, at 12-13 (citations omitted). I realize some have
challenged Adams's lucidity at the point in his life when the comments were
made. See Amar, supra note 21, at 752-53:
The Indeterminacy Thesis might deny that any such central meaning
exists. The concept of Republican Government, Indeterminists would

argue, is utterly vacuous. In 1807, John Adams complained to Mercy
Otis Warren that he had "never understood" what a republican was
and "no other man ever did or ever will." But as the great historian
Gordon Wood has observed, Adams' "memory was playing him badly"
representing "the bewilderment of a man whom ideas had passed by."
Yet, other eminent historians find that Adams remained vigorous and alert
through this period. See ELLIS, supra note 14. Again, we are confronted with
the reality that the past is often no more distinct than the future. Here, I will
side with what Adams said and leave the interpretations to others.

